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Abstract
We live in a digital era where the global community relies on Information Systems to conduct all kinds
of operations, including averting or responding to unanticipated risks and disasters. This can only
happen when there is a robust information exchange facilitation mechanism in place, which can help in
taking quick and legitimate steps in dealing with any kind of emergent situation. Prior literature in the
field of information assurance has focused on building defense mechanisms to protect assets and reduce
vulnerability to foreign attacks. Nevertheless, information assurance does not simply mean building an
impermeable membrane and safeguarding information, but also implies letting information be securely
shared, if required, among a set of related groups or organizations that serve a common purpose. This
Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
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chapter will revolve around the central pivot of Information Sharing. Further, to study the relative
significance of various information dimensions in different disaster situations, content analyses are
conducted. The results hence obtained can be used to develop a prioritization framework for different
disaster response activities, thus to increase the mitigation efficiency. We will also explore roles played
by few existing organizations and technologies across the globe that are actively involved in Information
Sharing to mitigate the impact of disasters and extreme events.

Introduction
Information assurance is the process of ensuring
that the right people get the right information
at the right time. This term is sometimes used
interchangeably with information security but in
a broader connotation, it is a superset of information security and also comprise of managing
relevance, integrity, accuracy, authentication,
confidentiality and other similar attributes of
information (Thomas, Ang, Parbati Ray, &
Nof, 2001). The main thrust of this chapter is on
Information Sharing, which plays a crucial role
in mitigating dire consequences of any disaster
or threat to our social/business infrastructure.
Here we will be analyzing different attributes
of information which will also be referred to as
information quality dimensions in the sections
ahead and will draw some inference on deciding about their priorities during different kinds
of disaster. So we will be studying information
assurance through the spectrum of Information
Sharing during disasters. It is important to note
here that the terms disasters, emergency, crisis,
calamity and catastrophe, all may have different
meanings in their respective fields. However, as
a part of this chapter, all these terms refer to the
same context and may appear interchangeably.
Similarly, information attributes and information
quality dimension are both assumed to mean the
same.
Information Sharing is a fundamental component of a successful security program. With the
high-level of inter-dependent business operations
among business partners and automated control
systems, organizations can derive value from
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accessing and sharing appropriate information.
Nevertheless, doing the same in a secure fashion
is indeed a daunting challenge, since we have to
deal with information content that ranges from
the simple to the complex (e.g., travel records,
weather information, citizenship records, financial information, intelligence reports, military
positions and logistical data, map data, etc.) in
an interoperable environment that is constantly
changing (Phillips, Ting, & Demurjian, 2002).
Therefore, it becomes very important to understand the significance of various information
attributes during any disaster management operation, because handling information in a way
that can facilitate the special information needs
of the particular disaster will expedite the relief
operations. Our interest is to help disaster management organizations (DMO) prepare a framework
for quick and secure Information Sharing that
is required in response to a crisis, e.g., natural
disaster (earthquake, hurricane), terrorist attacks
(biological warfare or explosions), etc.

Background
In the United States, There are approximately
30,000 local governments, 30,000 local fire
departments, 18,000 local police departments,
15,000 school districts, and 3,400 county governments (Pelfrey, 2005). Many organizations
collaborate together for responding to a major
disaster; for example during the disaster response
of 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City, there
were 1,607 governmental and non-governmental
organizations involved (Kapucu, 2004). Major
international volunteer organizations such as the
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Red Cross and Voluntary Organizations Active in
Disasters (VOAD) also played an important role
in mitigating the disaster impact. Incompatible
technology can be a serious concern for all of
these organizations. During 9/11 response activity,
there was a big communication bottleneck created
between responders from different organizations
of New York City due to incompatible radio
systems. The usage of analog radios by the Fire
Department failed in the same way as it happened
during 1993 World Trade Center attack (Jaeger,
et al., 2007). The following excerpt highlights the
technological barrier to the Information Sharing
during 9/11 attack:
Firefighters, police, and other emergency personnel at the Pentagon and in New York City could
not find common radio frequencies to communicate—cell phone networks flooded frequencies
and further hindered information flow in the hours
following the 9/11 attacks. (Riley, 2003)
The overall coordination and Information
Sharing was even more concerning during the
response to Hurricane Katrina. Federal, state and
local government agencies and private organizations were very inefficient in coordinating and
interrelating their activities, lacked an overall
operational concept and had no proper system at
place to track and share information (Wise, 2006),
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff
told Congress that the response was ‘‘significantly
hampered by a lack of information on the ground’’
(Chertoff, 2005 ) and the White House report on
the failures of the Katrina response mentioned it
as ‘‘inability to connect multiple communication
plans and architectures clearly impeded coordination and communication at the federal, state, and
local levels’’ (WhiteHouse, 2006).
In an emergency, it’s generally not possible to
know all the answers yourself, but it’s quite important to know the resource/entities or collaborating
organization that has the answer. Disasters, as
we know are mostly unexpected and unavoidable

events. Today we are aware of which regions are
prone to tornadoes or hurricanes and where the
earthquake faults are buried. But what we can
never accurately predict, with a comfortable degree of certainty, is what path the hurricane will
take, when the earth will shake, how and when
terrorists will launch their attack, or where the
plane will crash. Yet one thing we surely know
is that when a disaster strikes, there will be a
pressing need for reliable information exchange to
take place. How well we are able to manage that
information before, during, and after a disaster can
have a direct impact on how well we manage the
crisis. So the real essence of Information Sharing is to let the correct information timely reach
the appropriate receiver, at the right place and in
an understandable format. And this is where the
equilibrium gets lost immediately after the disaster. All the information attributes go haywire,
unanticipated delays occur, confusion prevails all
ultimately resulting in bad emergency response
decisions and actions. If a general framework can
guide disaster management organizations to focus
on more critical information attributes in different
types of emergency situations, it will expedite
the emergency response operations and will be a
boost for disaster management. Previous research
in this area focused on describing the emergence
and development of the disaster situation under
scrutiny, adopting a case study and qualitative
analysis approach. While such studies suggest
some factors that could influence the performance
of disaster management operations in the study
context and offer an insight into the particular
situation, not many studies have offered objective
evidence that certain attributes of information is
critical in a disaster response operations.

Information Quality
Intuitively and broadly, “Information Quality” is
the degree to which information meets the needs of
its users (Gasser & Twidale, 2005 ). Since differ-
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ent people use information for different purposes,
it often happens that information which is high
quality for one user is low quality for another.
For example, when a large-scale wildfire breaks
out, information about weather conditions is more
relevant for fire crew and evacuation teams than
it is for police and Emergency Medical Service
(EMS). That’s because fire crew may have to use
different attack plan to fight against spreading
fire, while evacuation team need to determine the
best evacuation path depending on the changing
direction and strength of the wind. Similarly the
information about approximate casualty level
might be more important for Emergency Medical
Services since they need to dispatch sufficient
medical resources to the disaster site, while preserving as much medical resources as possible
for other areas. Yet, it is very important that all
information that is sent across from one organization/entity to another is of high quality for a
successful emergency response.

Quality Dimensions
Information quality as such, unfortunately, is difficult to observe, capture or measure. Information
quality dimensions are the means by which we
can measure quality of Information (H. Miller,
1996). Several researchers have identified the
dimensions of information quality with as many
as 15 dimensions identified by Strong et al. in
2002. In another research project, a literature
review was conducted to find out the list of most
common information quality dimensions (Parker,
2006). In that study, papers dealing with all quality dimensions and published during the years
1996-2005 were examined and the frequency
of each dimension was calculated across those
publications. In this chapter, we adopt the nine
common information quality dimensions identified by the previous study (Parker, 2006). They
are discussed briefly below:
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Timeliness
Timeliness is the degree to which information is
up-to-date. It can be seen in an objective fashion,
meaning that information represents the current
state of the real world. Timeliness can also be seen
as task-dependent, meaning that the information
is timely enough to be used for a specific task. It
is one of the most important quality dimensions
for handling disasters, because providing new
information instantly is a major success factor
of preventing a disaster or mitigating its effect.
Information must be timely, and not “stale”. Stale
information is what has become outdated and
has been replaced by new information. The implications of untimely/stale information during a
disaster can be considerable. Not only does it lead
to the expending of valuable time in processing
that information, but it also prevents the appropriate response needed by the actual situation.
To enable coordination and synchronization of
multiple operations, information has to be up to
date. Quoting an e-mail sent by a White House
Homeland Security Council officer during the
Katrina response:
… sending us very stale sit rep info that has already been updated (earlier) by the HSOC is not
as helpful. Is there a way to coordinate the info
flow so we don’t waste time receiving such old
data and you folks don’t waste time sending us
stuff? (Christopher & Robert, 2002)
Also, Timeliness and Accuracy go hand in
hand. When a situation changes dynamically,
any situational information that is not timely is
not accurate.

Security
Security has been identified as another important
information quality dimension. If information
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is not secure, it can be easily intercepted by any
intelligent opponent (e.g., terrorists, criminals) and
used in a harmful manner. For example, if there
is a huge fire that needs to draw police, medical and fire responders from surrounding areas,
and if a criminal comes to know this, (s)he can
take undue advantage of this information: (S)He
can identify which area lacks police force and
commit a crime in that area. This information
quality dimension is especially important when
there exists an active and strategic opponent (e.g.,
in a terrorist attack situation), as the degree of
damage that can be done by information leakage in such cases can be extremely higher. Two
aspects of information security include protecting
information from intentional and unintentional
human acts (information security) and protecting information from disasters (disaster recovery
planning). Cyber security relies on logical barriers
such as data encryption, passwords and transaction authentication, along with human vigilance.
Disaster recovery planning involves protecting
information and ensuring appropriate back-up
and alternate processing procedures are in place
(H. Miller, 1996).

Accessibility
For information to be utilized in an effective manner, it must be accessible. Accessibility implies the
degree to which information is available, easily
obtainable or quickly retrievable when needed.
But this availability of information to the users
is generally within the constraints of policy and
confidentiality. Knowledge of the existence of information, its availability, and the tools necessary
to acquire it are key attributes of access (Fuerth,
1997). It enables Information Sharing, giving an
impression as if resources were centralized. When
coupled with timeliness, it permits synchronization of interdependent activities. Accessibility
is an important issue in a disaster situation as it
often happens that all means of communication get
disrupted in a disaster. For example, during Hur-

ricane Katrina, the communication infrastructure
was completely devastated in many parts of the
affected area, and the responders had very tough
time in coordinating their emergency response
operations (D. R. Miller, 2006).
… It got to the point that people were literally
writing messages on paper, putting them in bottles
and dropping them from helicopters to other people
on the ground. (WhiteHouse, 2006)
The disaster management organizations should
identify the technical and other barriers limiting
the access to information during disasters and
make a cooperative effort to surmount them.

Completeness
Completeness is the degree to which information
is not missing. Incomplete information can be
hazardous. However, complete information for one
person may be incomplete for another. For example, emergency medical services, FBI and Fire
crew, all may be interested in the weather conditions around the disaster site, but each may require
different levels of detail. Just as information of
which precision exceeds a recipient’s processing
capability may be too accurate, information may
also be too complete. During a disaster, it’s also
an adverse situation that the amount of information generated is so much that processing it all in
a timely fashion becomes infeasible. At the same
time, in a disaster response, if information is incomplete, it becomes difficult for the responders
to accurately assess the situation and hence they
are unable to respond effectively. The following
excerpt illustrates this situation:
…..Each data set was examined to evaluate the
completeness of records as a useful indicator of
quality. The mere recording of the occurrence of
a disaster with no other information on it makes
the record essentially unusable for analyses.
(Debarati & Below, 2000)
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Accuracy
Accuracy is the degree of correctness and precision
with which information in an automated system
represents states of the real world. It is a very
important quality dimension that on which many
early information quality studies have focused
(Alexander, 1999; Katerattanakul & Siau, 1999;
Strong, Lee, & Wang, 1997). Within information production processes inside organizations,
accuracy can be improved by implementing
institutional procedures, like having information
double checked by two independent people, or by
installing technical means, like calibrating sensors or verifying shipping address information
received through a website against an address
database. The concept of accuracy implies the
assumption that information can be captured in an
objective fashion. Thus, accuracy is not applicable
to subjective information, like destructive impact,
public perception or political views. Inaccurate
information may be worse than no information at
all. Example, if a fire crew does not know the type
and extent of situation at a disaster site, they will
at least try to extract more information. However,
if they have been given inaccurate information,
they may respond with inappropriate strategy,
which may lead to loss of innocent lives. Similarly,
inaccurate information about the death toll in a
disaster can lead to pandemonium in public.

Coherence
Coherent information is what “gels” or blends
with itself consistently. Incoherent information
can lead to confusion and panic during a disaster.
This can lead to wastage of valuable time as well
as resources. Coherence implies that two or more
values do not conflict with each other. Information generated during a disaster is likely to be
inconsistent as multiple information providers,
which might use different procedures to capture
information, have different levels of knowledge
and different views of the world. Since most people
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are exposed to information through a number
of media and from various sources, it must be
consistent in order to be credible. Inconsistent
information tends to confuse people and allows
them to discount some or all of it. For example:
numerous organizations--state agencies, the Red
Cross, school authorities, and media outlets--in
California met in the immediate aftermath of the
Loma Prieta quake just to discuss and agree upon
the wording all of them would use for the “Drop,
Cover, and Hold!” message.(Sarah et al, 1999)

Relevance
Relevancy is the extent to which information is
applicable and helpful for the task at hand. Information must be relevant as per the demands
of situation, i.e., it must address the needs of the
end user to whom it is being transmitted. For
example, when a user calls a 911 operator to
tell about an emergency, he might tell irrelevant
details out of panic. The operator must analyze
what information should be sent across to the
responders and ask relevant questions to complete
the information. The key component for information quality is whether the information addresses
its user’s needs. If not, then the user will find the
information inadequate regardless of how well
the information rates along other dimensions
mentioned in this chapter.

Validity
Information should be valid in the sense that it
must be true and verified; it must satisfy the set
standards related to other dimensions such as
accuracy, timeliness, completeness and security.
The most common form of information validation
is auditing. Auditing can uncover mistakes and is
a good way to measure the quality of information
(Whitehouse, 2006). Validity is a resultant rather
than a causal dimension of information quality.
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This means that even though some information
may be classified as being highly ‘valid’, it still
may fall under poor quality information if other
crucial dimensions like accuracy, timeliness etc.
is absent (H. Miller, 1996).
…..When indicators possess high degree of reliability and validity, the data and information they
generate is more useful in continuously improving
performance. Conversely, indicators that are unreliable and invalid produce confusing, irrelevant
and useless data and information while consuming
precious resources.….. (O’Leary, 2004)

Format
Information must be in such a format that it is
uncomplicated and easily understood by the end
user. This is especially true in a disaster situation as minimum time must be wasted between
information processing and actual response.
Information format refers to how the information
is presented to the user. Two key components of
information format are its underlying form and
its context for interpretation, which is sometimes
referred to as its frame (H. Miller, 1996). The appropriate format for information depends on the
information’s recipient and the information’s use.
For example, while giving demographic details or
statistics of any past event, multi-color pie charts
may be a better format than putting numbers.
Moreover, during disaster management, if there
is a commonly agreed upon format for exchange
of information between two organizations, say
Fire department and 911 operators, it aids understandability and expedites the response. Since
there might be huge data to handle, it’s always
better to keep them formatted instead of letting
them go haywire.
For each disaster, too many database and software
have been developed and designed and millions
of money has been expended. These projects are
substantially costly and the main problem are the

existing of many parallel sub-systems and activities and repeat labor works in different database
format which have to be created for each hazard
management systems. Such methodology will be
so complicated due to implementation of different
platform, different database format, and different
program languages and so on. This will make all
projects costly and non-efficient. (Assilzadeh &
Mansor S.B., 2004)

Disaster Types
Disasters may be natural or man-made. Natural disasters include earthquake, natural fires,
volcanoes, tsunami, hurricane, landslide, flood,
drought, and so on. Man-made disasters include
bio/chemical/radiation/fire emergencies caused
by human error or by strategic opponents (e.g.,
terrorists) and so on. Whatever may be the disaster
type, it needs adequate and timely response by
several government agencies that interact and
exchange information with each other to combat
the disaster. In order to make the study more
manageable, in current context, we limit our scope
to hurricanes, earthquakes, and terrorist attacks.

Disaster Cases Analyzed
We have focused on the below disasters:
1.

2.

Katrina Hurricane: It was the third most
intense United States (U.S.) land-falling hurricane on record based on central pressure.
The catastrophic damage and loss of life
inflicted by this hurricane is an estimated
1,353 direct fatalities and 275,000 homes
damaged or destroyed. Total economic losses
could be greater than $100 billion (Groumann, Houston, & Lawrimore, 2005).
Indian Ocean Earthquake (and resulting
Tsunami): It originated with an epicenter
off the west cost of Sumatra, Indonesia on
December 26, 2004. It killed an estimated
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3.

4.

350,000 people and caused losses worth US
$4.45 billion (Athukorala & Resosudarmo,
2005)
9/11 Attacks: It occurred on September 11,
2001 when a series of suicide bombings using
hijacked commercial air-liners hit several
strategic US locations. The attacks killed
more than 2,600 people (9/11 Commission
report, 2005) and caused economic losses in
NYC worth US $83-$95 billion (Thompson,
2002).
Anthrax Attacks: During the fall of 2001,
mail packages containing large numbers
of Bacil lus anthracis spores were sent to
people at several locations in the US. 22
people got seriously infected and five of them
died. As many as 30,000 people in the U.S.
Postal Service (USPS) initiated preventive
antibiotic treatment (Alibek, Lobanova, &
Popov, 2005 ).

We selected the above mentioned four cases
for our research because they not only caused
loss of human life and capital, but also grabbed
widespread public and media attention in the
recent past. Out of these, Tsunami and Hurricane
Katrina are natural disasters and 9/11 attacks
and Anthrax attacks are man-made. Therefore,
our findings will also help in distinguishing
the relative significance of information quality
dimensions during disaster management in both
of these kinds of disasters.
Before we proceed with content analysis, let us
make a few statements about expected relationships between the above mentioned information
quality dimensions and one or more types of
the disasters examined in the content analysis.
Security will be obviously more important in
the two terrorist attacks (9/11 and Anthrax attacks) than in the other two disasters, because
strategic opponents are present. Accessibility
will be more important in disasters where communication infrastructure is damaged. Therefore,
we can expect that media articles about larger-
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scale disasters like Katrina and Tsunami would
put more weight on the accessibility dimension,
compared with other types of disasters of which
damages were isolated within a relatively small
geographical area (e.g., a city) or did not disrupt
telecommunication networks. Timeliness will
be more important when the threat situation in a
disaster develops dynamically and at a fast phase.
Thus, logically, media reports about 9/11 and the
Tsunami should emphasize timeliness more than
reports about the Anthrax attack.

CONTENT ANALYSIS
In order to be able to quantify the information
quality attributes so that they can be compared to
determine their relative importance in a disaster
situation, we used a semantic content analysis
approach. Content analysis is a research method
by means of which the presence of certain words
or concepts within a given text can be determined
(Busch, et al., 2005). Holsti (1969) broadly defines
content analysis as, “any technique for making
inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”. This
tool can be used to predict the content and meaning
of the text or article under consideration.
In our research, we used CATPAC as content
analysis software. CATPAC is a self-organizing
artificial neural network computer program that
has been optimized to read and analyze large
amounts of text (Kim, Song, Braynov, & Rao,
2005). This program identifies the most frequently
occurring concepts in a given text which can be
interpreted as a measure of importance, attention, or emphasis of that concept (Krippendorff,
1980).

Document Corpus Construction
Since we wanted to predict the importance of
information quality dimensions during a disaster
response, we collected several journal articles and
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news items relating to emergency response of each
disaster event under scrutiny. The articles were
collected from comprehensive databases such as
Academic Search Premier, MasterFILE Premier,
InfoTrac Newspapers, LexisNexis Academic, and
Factiva. After a manual inspection to assure relevance, we selected 50 media and journal articles
to conduct a semantic content analysis. The list
of these articles has been included in Appendix
A at the end of this chapter.

Semantic Analysis to Identify
Keywords
We created a list of keywords (Table 1) which
represent each quality dimension (semantically
equivalent categories). We included several synonyms while creating the list of keywords for each
dimension, considering the fact that authors may
use synonyms for stylistic reasons throughout a
document – if only a single word is used to do

content analysis, it can lead us to underestimate
the importance of a concept (Weber, 1990). For
example, an author might use the word ‘available’
or ‘reachable’ or ‘accessible’ while talking about
the ‘accessibility’ aspect of information, and so,
we need to consider all three words while doing
a content analysis. Similarly, the author might use
the word ‘inaccessible’ or ‘unavailable’ and still
be talking about ‘accessibility’ (rather, inaccessibility) aspect of information. As a result, our list
of keywords includes both synonyms as well as
antonyms to represent a quality dimension. While
we understand the limitation that every keyword
in each category may not represent that category
equally well, there is no well-defined procedure
to assign the weight of each word (Stemler, 2001).
Consequently, we proceeded with our research
under the assumption that all keywords for an
information quality dimension (i.e., category) are
of equal ‘weight’.

Table 1. Keywords
Information Quality
Dimension

Keywords

Timeliness

timeliness, delay, delays, time, timely, timelines, immediate,
immediately, late, early, prompt, slow, fast, speed, waiting, prolonged,
expedite, expedited

Security

safe, unsafe, secure, security, threat, threats, threaten, risk, risks,
violence, crime, criminal, lawlessness, terrorism, terrorist, protection,
protect, protected

Accessibility

accessible, inaccessible, communication, communicate,
communicating, reach, reached, coordination, coordinate

Completeness

incomplete, complete, adequate, inadequate, unknown, unaware,
insufficient, integrity, wholeness, entirety

Accuracy

accurate, inaccurate, accurately, confirmed, uncertainty, uncertain, rely,
reliable, relied, wrong, false

Coherence

coherent, inconsistent, ambiguous, confusion, conflicting, uniform,
concrete, consistent

Relevance

relevant, irrelevant, useless, useful, lengthy, redundant, applicable,
applicability, cogency, pertinence

Validity

valid, validated, invalid, obsolete, outdated, substantiate, substantiated,
unsubstantiated, credible, warrant, warranted, unwarranted

Format

standardized, complex, complexity, complicated, meaningful, unclear
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Frequency Analysis
We then conducted a content analysis of the articles
using CATPAC and summed up the frequency of
words for each dimension, with frequency counts
determining the relative concern of each dimension. Also, in order to ensure that we did not miss
any high frequency keyword that could possibly
represent an information quality dimension, we
reviewed all high frequency words in content
analysis results. Any word that we found was
highly correlated and semantically similar to an
existing keyword was added to our list, and then
the results were revised accordingly.
Total number of content bearing words for the
four disaster cases came out to be:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Hurricane Katrina: 4062
Tsunami (Indian Ocean Earthquake): 778
9/11 Attacks: 4995
Anthrax Attacks: 4082

Since most of the articles analyzed in this
study were published in the US, we can see that
the total number of content bearing words in
Tsunami is relatively less than those in the other
cases. Nevertheless, the total word count will not
have any impact in determining relative importance because we are measuring the hit density
of keywords belonging to different information
quality dimensions within a particular disaster.

Filtering Ambiguous Words
Simple frequency of words may not actually
represent the importance of each dimension as
words can have multiple meanings or appear in
multiple contexts. For example the word “uniform”
can have a noun meaning “clothing”, an adjective
meaning “evenly spaced”, or an adverb meaning “provide with uniform”. In order to resolve
the ambiguity in the context in which the words
appeared, we used the Key Word In Context
(KWIC) search to test for the consistency of word
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usage. We used HyperRESEARCH to pull up
the sentences in which the keywords were used
to perform a validation of our results (Stemler,
2001). HyperRESEARCH is a software package
that assists collection and analysis of qualitative
data. We reduced the word count wherever we
found that the context where the word appeared
was not ‘information’ or ‘information quality’
related.

Hit Density
Since the length of articles varied, the absolute
number of keywords appearing in the corpus
thus did not represent the actual relevance of
each dimension. Therefore, we calculated the
‘hit-density’ of keywords corresponding to each
information attribute. The hit density is a ratio
of the number of hits divided by the number of
content-bearing words in an article (Efthimiadis,
1993). Here we define the term ‘hits’ as the number
of words corresponding to the quality attribute
under consideration, and ‘number of content
bearing words’ as the total number of words that
represent all quality attributes for a given disaster
situation. For example, the number of words associated with the dimension ‘accessibility’ for the
disaster Katrina was 1,431, while the total number
of words obtained by summing up word count for
all dimensions for disaster Katrina was 4062. The
hit density is 1,431/4,062, i.e., 35. Accordingly, a hit
density index that represents the importance of an
information quality dimension can be compared
with those of other dimensions within a disaster
as well as across all disaster cases. The results of
hit density analysis are graphically represented
in Figure 1 to facilitate sense making and easy
reading of the results.
From the hit density analysis results, we can
observe several interesting differences within and
across different types of disasters.
1.

Security is, by far, the most important issue
in terrorist attacks (i.e., Anthrax and 9/11at-
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Figure 1. Hit density analysis

2.

tacks), while it still remains as the 2nd and
3rd important dimension in Tsunami and
Katrina cases respectively. We can induce
from this result that existence of an active
intelligent opponent (e.g., terrorist) can force
stakeholders (e.g., emergency responders,
potential victims) to maintain a high-level of
information security during emergency response operations. If information is insecure,
it could easily be intercepted and misused to
spread more terrorism. However, even when
there is no immediate threat from intelligent
opponents, security seems to remain as an
important concern to many stakeholders
(e.g., victims, the public, government agencies, non-government relief organizations),
because a large-scale disaster will inevitably
involves exchange of sensitive information
across different organizations with different
security requirements.
Timeliness was the most important issue in
the Tsunami case (35%) and the 2nd most
important issue, with almost equal levels
(22-25%), for the other cases. It is obvious that if information does not reach the
responders in time, they will not be able to

3.

respond before irrevocable and serious damages have already been done. One possible
explanation of the relatively high level of
the hit density in the Tsunami case may be
the time lag between the earthquake and
the strikes of tsunami at different regions,
because effective and timely warning might
allow potential victims to evacuate or minimize the damages. In addition, the extremely
higher number of casualty, as the death toll
(350,000) suggests, could require timely
responses to save valuable, yet perishing
lives.
Accessibility was the most important issue
in Katrina (35%), and the 3rd most important issue in all the other cases (9-18%).
However, the gap between Katrina and
the other cases are quite obvious, unlike
the timeliness dimension. We suspect that
the unexpected scale of damages on the
once-reliable communication infrastructure
could cause the surge of emphasis on accessibility. Also, the number and the variety of
organizations involved in the relatively long
recovery period, together with the level of
bureaucracy imposed by the hierarchical
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structure of the US disaster management
agencies could result in accessibility issues
among different stakeholders.
All the other dimensions (i.e., accuracy,
coherence, completeness, format, relevance,
and validity) are much less emphasized
(mostly below 5%), regardless of the types
of disaster, than the three most important
dimensions (i.e., accessibility, security,
timeliness). While it is still much lower than
the other dimensions, the hit density of completeness in the Katrina case is distinctively
higher than those in the other disasters. This
may also result from disruption of communication and transportation systems, as well
as reliance on archival systems that became
unavailable by the impact of the disaster. One
important point to make clear is that the low
levels of these dimensions do not necessarily
mean these are not important dimensions.
We assume that published articles reflect
the current issues in the respective context.
Therefore, we can consider the three most
important dimensions (i.e., accessibility,
security, and timeliness) as the ones that
became the center of hot discourse because
we have misunderstood their impacts, resulting in mis-configured disaster management
systems.

From the results of the comparative analyses
of information quality dimensions in different
disaster situations, we can conclude that these
dimensions hold varying significance across different disasters. We can also infer some factors that
might influence the differences in the importance
levels of the three most important dimensions.
Therefore, it is recommended that information
be exchanged between different organizations
on the basis of the circumstances and resulting
relative significance of these information quality
dimensions. The prioritization process which can
be created utilizing these results will certainly
help the emergency response operation to focus
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on the information quality dimension which
matters the most and thus will reduce the impact
of disaster significantly by expediting the relief
operations. Moreover, this will save time and
resources which get dissipated dealing with less
significant dimensions and thus can be utilized
in the right direction to respond to the disaster
in a better way.
In the previous sections, we discussed the
important attributes of information. Taking the
information security aspect a step further, let us
continue our research to analyze the aspects of
information assurance. We will perform content
analysis to explore the relative significance of
different dimensions of information assurance to
provide us with more valuable conclusions which
can be utilized to build a prioritization framework
in mitigating disaster impacts.

Information Assurance
Information assurance is often used interchangeably with information security. But in specific
terms, information assurance can be defined as
information operations that protect and defend
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication,
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes
provision for restoration of information systems by
incorporating protection, detection and reaction
capabilities (Maconachy, V., Schou, Ragsdale,
& Welch, 2001). At the heart of Information
assurance is the provisioning of five security
services: Availability, Integrity, Authentication,
Confidentiality, and Non-Repudiation which we
are considering as the five important dimensions
of information assurance.
1.

Availability can be defined as timely, reliable access to data and information services
for authorized users. It means that the information, the computing systems used to
process the information, and the security
controls used to protect the information
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3.

are all available and functioning correctly
when the information is needed. Often it is
viewed as a function, which is not entirely
security related. Availability is equated
with information system operations such
as redundant communication channels,
back-up power and off-site capabilities to
handle crisis. Availability is the utility part
of security services. There may be times
during the course of operations that demand
system availability at the expense of the other
security services. The decision to abandon
the other security services is a risk mitigation
decision often driven by threats and vulnerabilities that fall beyond the system security
parameters. Broadcasting a decision or some
critical information at the time of disaster,
to handle a life-threatening condition may
override concerns to do so in a totally secure
fashion (Maconachy, et al., 2001).
Integrity is “the quality of an information
system reflecting logical correctness and
reliability of an operating system; the logical
completeness of the hardware and software
implementing the protection mechanisms;
and the consistency of the data structures and
occurrence of the stored data.” (Lohse et al,
2003). It means that data cannot be created,
changed, or deleted without authorization.
In a formal security mode, integrity is
interpreted more narrowly to mean protection against unauthorized modification or
destruction of information. Data integrity is
a matter of degrees of trust. Integrity must
include the elements of accuracy, relevancy,
and completeness. Data and system integrity
implies robustness.
Authentication is a security service, “designed to establish the validity of a transmission, message, or originator, or a means of
verifying an individual’s authorizations to
receive specific categories of information”
(Maconachy, et al., 2001). Authentication
provides a foundation for many security

4.

5.

services by ensuring that data, transactions,
communications or documents (electronic
or physical) are not exposed to unauthorized entities thereby giving them a chance
to tamper or misuse them.
Confidentiality is “the assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized
persons, processes or devises” (Maconachy,
et al., 2001). The application of this security
service implies information labeling and
need-to-know imperatives are aspects of the
system security policy. Information that is
considered to be confidential in nature must
only be accessed, used, copied, or disclosed
by persons who have been authorized to do
so, and only when there is a genuine need
to do so. A breach of confidentiality occurs
when information that is considered to be
confidential in nature has been, or may have
been, accessed, used, copied, or disclosed
to, or by, someone who was not authorized
to have access to the information.
Non-Repudiation refers to the assurance
that “the sender of the data is provided with
proof of delivery and the recipient is provided
with proof of the sender’s identity, so neither
can later deny having processed the data”
(Fry, 2001). Non-repudiation has ramifications for electronic commerce as well as
battlefield orders. Electronic commerce
uses technology such as digital signatures
and encryption to establish authenticity and
non-repudiation.

Now let us do the content analysis of above
five mentioned dimensions by using the keywords
described below in Table 2, across all the four
disasters. Our research approach is the same as
we did in the previous content analysis.
After doing content analysis across all the four
disasters, we calculated the hit density, as done
in the previous section, and plotted them on the
bar chart as shown below in Figure 2:
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Table 2. Content analysis keywords
Information
assurance attributes

Keywords

Availability

Available, accessibility, accessible, inaccessible, communication,
communicate, communicating, reach, reached, unavailable,
availability, unavailability

Integrity

Completeness, wholeness, relevance, accuracy, incomplete, complete,
adequate, inadequate, insufficient, Tamper, tampering, repudiate,
manipulate, integrity

Authentication

Valid, genuine, certify, attest, evidence, validity, authenticity,
authenticate, authenticated, authenticates, manifest, manifestation,
authentication

Confidentiality

Privacy, secret, secrecy, private, classified, confidential,
confidentially, conceal, concealed, covert, covertly, unacknowledged,
confidentiality

Non-Repudiation

Reject, disown, renounce, repudiate, encryption, decryption,
time-stamp, time-stamped, signature, unfair, disclaimer, disclaim,
repudiation, non-repudiation

Figure 2. Hit density analysis

From the result of the above content analysis,
we can draw the following conclusions:
1.
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Confidentiality was the dominant concern
in 9/11 attack (64%), while it was the 2nd
most important issue in the other disasters
(31-38%). Interestingly, this attribute was not
as much emphasized in the other terrorist
attack case (i.e., anthrax attacks) as it was

in 9/11. This difference between the two
types of terrorist attack cases may come
from the nature of attack. In 9/11, the attack
was carried within a relatively short period
of time, and nothing was clear at the point
of attack, from which the US intelligence
community had to figure out what really
happened and how to handle the situation,
before the public is informed of what the

Information Sharing

2.

public needs to know. On the other hand,
the anthrax case involved multiple attacks
that aimed at seemingly random targets.
Therefore, the public, as a group of individuals who may become a victim of the next
attack had to be informed, educated, and
mobilized, in order to minimize the impact
of the attacks and maximize the chance to
catch the attacker by encouraging bottom-up
information flow for terrorist investigation
tips, in the anthrax case. Therefore, it’s very
important to assure confidentiality of any
information that has a potential to have a
negative consequence, should the information fall in the hands of active opponents,
while confidentiality should give a way to
availability (or some other attributes) if the
situation requires cooperation from other
relief agencies or the public.
In contrast to confidentiality, Availability was a more important attribute in the
Anthrax attack (46%), Katrina (51%), and
Tsunami (47%) cases. It took 20% of the
content-bearing words in the 9/11 case,
which is a smaller portion, but still the
2nd important dimension. This may reflect
issues like inconsistent access control for
inter-organizational Information Sharing,
lack of redundancy in communication
links, absence of good backup practice, and
improper business continuity planning for
disaster management operations. The results
show that confidentiality and availability
are two most critical information quality
dimensions, together taking a major portion
(79 -89%) of the content-bearing information
security words in the four disaster cases. The
hit densities of Authentication, Integrity,
and Non-Repudiation were relatively low,
suggesting that these dimensions were less
of concern in the studied disasters. Nonrepudiation appears especially irrelevant
to the disaster management situation.

The results obtained can be utilized by government and non-government disaster management
organizations to align their relief operations more
effectively, by devising special mechanism to take
care of every mentioned information attribute as
per their significance. There are different organizations which are involved in different types and
stages of disaster management operations. Among
other information assurance attributes, they tend
to focus on availability and confidentiality of
information. The results suggest that availability is the most important information assurance
dimension in the disaster management context,
unless the situation requires confidentiality (e.g.,
information about the situation may benefit strategic opponents), in which case confidentiality may
become the dominant dimension of information
assurance quality over the usual golden rule of
“availability goes first”.
In Appendix B, we will touch upon a few
of organizations and technologies that can help
disaster management organizations achieve appropriate levels of availability and confidentiality
for information assurance, while accommodating
relevant information quality dimensions (e.g.,
accessibility, security, timeliness), in a disaster
response situation. By utilizing these organizational and technological supports, relief agencies,
esp. those who often participate in large-scale,
multi-agency disaster management operations,
will be able to better prepare for and improve their
performance in different types of disasters.

Conclusion
In a disaster, every moment counts. A single
minute saved can save a large number of lives,
and thus it is very important to utilize time in the
most efficient manner during the disaster response
operations. Unfortunately, the situation often
goes haywire immediately after the disaster, and
the relief operations do not necessarily go in the
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planned manner, giving rise to chaos all around
and thus information quality suffers. There exists
an urgent need for a prioritization framework on
the basis of which information quality dimensions
can be weighed and their relative significance
used to orient the emergency response operations.
In this chapter, we have reviewed nine information quality dimensions, which led us to deduce
relative significance of some of the information
attributes across different disaster types. Based
on the results of our content analyses, this chapter
provides empirical evidence that effective disaster
management requires a right mix of information quality dimensions to be achieved in their
communication, depending on the particular
circumstances of the disaster. We also discussed
several key organizations and technologies that
can promote information assurance in disaster
management and improve various aspects of
information quality.
The results of our analysis suggest that security
is one of the most important information quality
dimensions for all types of disaster management,
but a much higher level of information security
must be provided when an active intelligent opponent (e.g., terrorist) may take advantage of the
information about the situation. Timeliness is
another very important attribute for all disaster
types, but it may gain weight when there is a
time lag between a sign of potential damage (e.g.,
ocean earthquake, request for an ambulance) and
actual strike of the disaster (tsunami reaching a
coastline, death of a life), during which potential
victims or emergency responders can be prepared
to minimize the impact. Disaster responders
should pay more attention to accessibility if they
need to respond to a disaster that affected a large
geographical area. Interestingly, all the other dimensions included in our analysis did not receive
much attention in the four disaster cases.
The chapter further analyzed 5 sub-dimensions of the information security dimension, one
of the three hottest issues in the current disaster
management communications. The results that
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we have obtained thus can be used by public and
private sector disaster management organizations
to create an information dissemination prioritization framework when responding in an emergency
situation. Such a framework will aid decisionmaking when communicating information across
organizations during a disaster. For example,
agencies will know when to wait for information
to get ‘complete’ while it is still ‘secure,’ and when
to ensure that information is ‘secure’ while it is
still ‘complete,’ and so forth.
While mostly in tandem with our predictions,
the results of the content analyses also call for
more research in this area. For example, a follow-up study may identify different dimensions
of disasters (e.g., geographical and time span
of the impact/recovery, number of involved responders/relief agencies, changes in the casualty
at each phases of the disaster), which will allow
more systematic analysis of possible relationships
between information attributes and disaster attributes. Similarly, research on organizational
attributes of disaster management organizations
is highly likely to improve our understanding on
the relative importance of information attributes.
Also, the importance of various information
quality dimensions can be measured on a single
reference frame, which will allow direct comparison of the absolute value of the attributes. From
a citizen-centric view point, analyzing personal
web blogs or comments on first responder websites
to understand the relative value of G2C (Government to Citizens) disaster communications will
also be a meaningful research avenue. As such,
we believe that our findings and discussions in
this chapter can provide a fertile ground for future
studies in the field of disaster management and
information security.
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Appendix B: ORGanizational and technological resources
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)
A partnership between Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and public and private sector organizations, US-CERT is charged with improving cyber security preparedness and response in the
United States. Through US-CERT, companies can access valuable educational resources, find up-todate security information and receive security alerts. Individual companies are encouraged to register
with them to receive alerts, warnings and other cyber security related information that is relevant to
company-specific technology.
Cyberspace is a combination of distinct information infrastructures, including government and
business operations, emergency preparedness communications, and critical digital and process control
systems. Protecting these systems is very important to the resilience and reliability of the Nation’s critical infrastructures and key resources and, therefore, to its economic and national security. US-CERT
has a very important responsibility to analyze and reduce cyber threats and vulnerabilities, disseminate cyber threat warning information, and coordinate incident response activities. They collaborate
with other organizations like Federal agencies, the research community, private sector, state and local
governments, and international organizations. By coordinating with different incident response centers
using both classified and unclassified systems, US-CERT disseminates reasoned, critical and actionable
cyber-security information to the public. (DHS Cyber Security, 2006)
The different collaboration efforts of US-CERT include:
•

•
•

•

•

•

US-CERT Web Portal: Provides a secure web-based collaborative system to share sensitive
cyber-related information with government and industry members. And secondly it provides the
government, private sector, and public with information needed to improve US-CERT’s ability to
protect information systems and infrastructures; includes information on current activity, events,
resources, publications, and affiliates.
National Cyber Alert System: Delivers targeted, timely, and actionable information to Americans,
educating them on how to secure their own computer systems.
National Cyber Response Coordination Group: Established in partnership with the Department
of Defense and the Department of Justice; serves as the federal government’s principal interagency
mechanism to coordinate efforts to respond to and recover from cyber incidents of national significance.
Government Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (GFIRST): Embodies a community of more than 50 incident response teams from various federal agencies working together
to secure the federal government.
US-CERT Einstein Program: Involves an automated process for collecting, correlating, analyzing,
and sharing computer security information across the federal government to improve our Nation’s
cyber situational awareness.
Internet Health Service: Provides information about Internet activity to federal government
agencies throughout the GFIRST community.

After the calamity caused by Hurricane Katrina, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) realized that many critical infrastructure control systems were shutdown, damaged, or destroyed. Hence
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they provided assistance to owners and operators in rebuilding and securely restarting those sensitive
control systems. In order to assist control system owners, vendors, operators, and service providers in
bringing control systems, and the sensitive processes and functions they monitor and manage, back into
operation as safely and as securely as possible under the circumstances, the DHS US-CERT Control
Systems Security Center (CSSC) compiled a set of items to consider when restarting and rebuilding
control systems. (US-CERT, 2005)

CEO COM LINK for Business Roundtable CEOs
The Critical Emergency Operations Communications Link (CEO COM LINKSM) is a secure telephone
communications system that will enable the nation’s top CEOs to enhance the protection of America’s
employees, communities and infrastructure by communicating with leading government officials and
each other about a threat or during national crises. This communication system links each of the Business Roundtable’s 150 CEOS with the federal government to coordinate communication and facilitate
effective response in times of crisis. Rapidly linking the private and public sectors during crisis can
dramatically improve collaboration and effectiveness in enhancing homeland security.
The CEO COM LINK, developed by Business Roundtable, is an essential tool that enables this collaboration prior to, during, and in the aftermath of a significant national crisis. CEOs are alerted that
the system is being activated and dial in to a secure conference call number. Each caller goes through a
multi-step authentication process to ensure that only authorized participants are on the call. The calls also
would allow CEOs to ask questions or share information with government leaders and with each other.
Business rules have been established to govern calls and handle sensitive information (BRT, 2003).
Security is of utmost importance to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information being
shared. A critical security component is authentication. Each CEO is issued a means of authentication
(e.g., voiceprints, caller ID), so a caller’s identity can be verified. Because the private sector owns or operates 90 percent of our nation’s critical infrastructures – including airlines, railroads, financial markets,
telecommunications services and information services – CEO leadership in combating terrorist threats is
critical to America’s security. A timely and effective exchange of information between government and
the private sector – and among business leaders – is critical for our nation’s ability to detect additional
threats, maintain homeland security, and respond effectively to threats or disasters.

Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS)
GETS is a White House directed emergency phone service provided by the National Communications
System through the Department of Homeland Security. GETS provides emergency access and priority
processing in local and long distance in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). It provides
Federal, State and local government National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) users with
a ubiquitous switched voice and voice-band data communications service and is used during periods of
natural or man-made disasters or emergencies that cause congestion or network outages.
Different imperatives of GETS are:
•
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Access Authorization: GETS access control is accomplished through the use of Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to ensure only authorized users gain access to GETS features and protect
against fraud.
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•

•

Enhanced Routing: GETS calls use extensive enhancements to the PSTN’s robust network of
interconnecting paths between switches. With these enhancements to the grid of multiple switch
connections, GETS calls can still be connected without any disruptions even when numerous
switch failures occur in the PSTN.
Priority Treatment: GETS allows that a high probability call identifier can be carried across the
signaling network and used to trigger priority features such as trunk queuing and trunk reservation for designated emergency management communications.

European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)
The objective of ENISA is to improve network and information security in the European Union. The
agency has to contribute to the development of a culture of network and information security for the
benefit of the citizens, consumers, enterprises and public sector organizations of the European Union,
and consequently will contribute to the smooth functioning of the EU Internal Market.
Different tasks done by ENISA are:
•
•
•

•

•
•
•

Collect appropriate information to analyze current and emerging network and information security
risks and provide the results of the analysis to Member States and the Commission;
Provide advice and, if appropriate, assistance within its objectives to the European Parliament,
the Commission and other competent bodies;
Enhance cooperation between the different players in the sector (e.g., by organizing collaboration
links between enterprises and universities) and facilitating cooperation between the Commission
and the Member States in the development of common methodologies to prevent security problems;
Contribute to awareness raising and the availability of rapid, objective and comprehensive information on network and information security issues for all users. This can be achieved by promoting
exchanges of best current practice, including methods of alerting users;
Assist the Commission and the Member States in their dialogue with industry to address security
related problems in hardware and software products;
Track the development of standards for security products and services and promote risk assessment
activities;
Contribute to Community efforts to cooperate with third countries and international organizations
to promote a global common approach to security issues.
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